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America’s Founding Protestant Philosophy
Nicholas P. Miller, JD, PhD1
We tend to think of the battle between religion and secularism as a distinctly modern one. We often see it as arising in the early 20th century, or at the 
earliest, in the late 19th century, with the rise of Darwinism and philosophical 
positivism. But the con!ict is a lot older than that, even if we limit our view to 
post-medieval western Europe. Even before the skeptical philosophes of the French 
Revolution, such as Voltaire and Rousseau, the ideas of Hume and Spinoza were 
challenging conventional views of religious revelation. But an even more important 
point than the age of the con!ict is its originally tri-part, rather than dual nature. It 
was not religion versus secularism, but rather one kind of medieval-like church/state 
arrangements versus various kinds of “enlightened” ideologies that promoted the 
idea of a state that was neutral in matters of religion. 1
Some of these “enlightenment” ideologies were overtly hostile towards ideas of 
revelation and theistic religion. For these systems, separation of church and state 
needed to happen to protect a reasoned, enlightened state from the superstitions 
and misguided zeal of religious fanatics. But other versions of these “enlightenment” 
systems of thought were sympathetic towards religious claims. Indeed, some versions 
seemed to be products of certain kinds of dissenting religious thought. "ese sought 
a separation of church and state out of a mutual respect for the dual but di#ering 
spheres of sovereignty assigned to each one. Both, it was thought, should protect 
and respect the role of the other.
I am certainly not the $rst to make this observation about the diversity of 
enlightenment, or what we have come to call, secular thought. In the 1970s, Henry 
May wrote his famous book, !e Enlightenment in America, that identi$ed four 
strands of the enlightenment. Of interest to us is his “skeptical enlightenment,” 
which was much like the stereotypical, anti-religious, skeptical kind of secularity 
found in revolutionary France. But there was also the “moderate enlightenment,” a 
much more religiously-sympathetic, even in!uenced, system of thought found in 
Scotland and England. "ere was also the “Didactic Enlightenment,” !owing from 
Scotland to America, which was also very religious in perspective, with many of its 
1    Nicholas Miller, (BA, Union College; JD, Columbia University PhD, Notre Dame University), is an Associate 
Professor of Church History Director, International Religious Liberty Institute at Andrews University, Berrien 
Springs, Michigan.
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primary thinkers being Protestant clergymen.
I raise this point about the diversity of secularities in early America to draw the 
contrast with today, where secularism seems all on the non-religious side. In today’s 
battles over religious freedom between the religious and the secular, the di#erences 
between how di#erent religious believers view church and state has become over-
shadowed by the apparent gulf between skeptics and believers. "e implications of 
May’s work on the Enlightenment, however, is that the modern contest is not two-
sided, but three-sided. "ere is a moderating position between the so-called religious 
right and secular left, one based on the dissenting Protestant heritage that came to 
be forcefully expressed at the constitutional founding. I think an understanding of 
this position can be helpful to other communities and societies as they seek to bring 
culturally religious peoples into an acceptance of the freedoms and tolerances o#ered 
by a secular government. It can show a pathway to how secularism does not need to 
mean anti-religious. 
"is position can be understood by examining di#ering approaches of each to 
the relationships between the individual, church, state, and God. To understand our 
possible futures, it will be helpful to revisit the past. Speci$cally, the end of the sev-
enteenth century when the revocation of the Edict of Nantes sent legal thinkers to 
their libraries to prepare defenses of religious toleration. At that time, these positions 
were ably expressed by three of the most brilliant legal and theological minds of that 
time.
"e three were Samuel Pufendorf, a Lutheran natural rights lawyer and counsel-
or to the King of Sweden; John Locke, political philosopher whose acquaintance we 
have already well made; and Pierre Bayle, an in!uential French Huguenot theologian 
and philosopher. In their writings can be found the basic outlines of the Puritan, 
semi-theocratic model; the separationist model based on the right of private judg-
ment; and the secular, liberal separationist model.2
1.1  Pufendorf and Medieval Privileges
Born in 1632 in Saxony, Pufendorf was best known for his works on inter-
national law, especially !e Law of Nature and Nations. 3 Published in 1672, this 
work was widely in!uential on the continent, in Scotland, and in the newly formed 
American colonies.4 When the Edict of Nantes was revoked, Pufendorf took the op-
portunity to write what has been described as an “appendix,” which applied his natu-
2    "is article includes material originally published in Nicholas P. Miller, “"e Dawn of the Age of Toleration: 
Samuel Pufendorf and the Road not Taken,” Journal of Church and State, Vol. 50, Spring 2008, 255-275.    
3    Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Quali"cation of Religion in Reference to Civil Society (Indianapolis, IN: 
Liberty Fund, 2002), xii-xiii.    A discussion of Pufendorf and his views on toleration can be found at Simone Zur-
buchen, “From Denominationalism to Enlightenment: Pufendorf, Le Clerc, and "omasius on Toleration,” in John 
Christian Laursen, ed., Religious Toleration: “!e Variety of Rites” From Cyrus to Defoe (New York, NY: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1999), 191-204.
4    J.B. Schneewind, !e Invention of Autonomy (UK:Cambridge University Press, 1998), 118.
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ral law theory to issues of church and state.5 Entitled Of the Nature and Quali"ca-
tion of Religion in Reference to Civil Society (“Religion and Civil Society”), Pufendorf ’s 
work was published in 1687. It set out a principled basis for what was ultimately a 
pragmatic, anemic toleration. It represented the magisterial Protestant continuation 
of the medieval view of church and state. 
Pufendorf dedicated the book to the elector of Brandenburg-Prussia and used 
it to recommend himself for a post in the elector’s Berlin court, which he indeed 
received.6 "e intended audience perhaps helped shape the work. He sets out a high 
view of the state and its power and a rather limited and weak basis for religious 
toleration. "e work begins with apparently strong principles of separation between 
ecclesiastical and civil spheres, as well as a commitment to individual rights. But 
the last third of the book returns spiritual powers and oversight to the “Christian” 
ruler that is denied to secular rulers in the $rst portions of the book. To simplify 
his thinking in a useful way, we can diagram it. "e diagram contains four basic 
elements: God/Truth, the church, the state, and the individual. Pufendorf ’s arrange-
ment of these elements would look like this:
Here, God and the accessibility of truth are recognized. A distinction between 
church and state is also accepted, but that distinction allows for a great deal of 
cooperation, especially when the ruler is a Christian. "e importance of the indi-
vidual is minimized, because of his or her need to go through the organs of church 
and state to obtain truth, whether spiritual or civil. It represents the world of the 
divine right of kings and popes, where no individual rights exist, but only privileges 
extended by the rulers. It is one where church and state are distinct entities, but play 
a role in cooperating to civilly enforce the majority religious beliefs and practices of 
society. Under this system, the church in theory has a superior position in society, as 
kings and ruler are subject to the superior spiritual authority of church. Bishops and 
Popes at times provided legitimacy to the claims of leaders to civil authority, at times 
crowning them, as Pope Leo III did for Charlemagne. "is relationship is shown by 
the capital “C” and lowercase “s.” 
Pufendorf criticized the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, but not because 
the Huguenots had some sort of natural right claim to religious liberty. Rather, he 
believed that the crown, once having extended the toleration, should keep its word 
5    Pufendorf, Religion in Reference to Civil Society, xi.
6    Ibid., xiii.
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and not withdraw it. It was a question of honoring agreements and contracts, and 
the social stability protected by that practice. Pufendorf had no principled or moral 
argument for why the Edict should have been entered into in the $rst place. "at 
was a policy calculation that brought political peace against an aggressive and armed 
minority. In Pufendorf ’s model, religious liberty became a question of policy, a privi-
lege to be extended or denied at the inclination of the ruler. His philosophical fruit 
fell not far from the medieval tree.
1.2  Locke and Protestant Rights
John Locke’s church/state principles were most clearly outlined in his Letter on 
Toleration published in 1789. His views show the shape of the new world that Luther 
helped create in proposing that each person should access God through prayer and 
Bible study. "e priesthood of all believers inverted the bottom half of Pufendorf ’s 
diagram. "e belief vaulted the individual to a position above the church and the 
state, with direct access to God and truth. Locke’s model of these four elements 
would look like this:
"is model accepted, like the medieval model, that God exists and that certain 
truths can be ascertained about both the world and spiritual things. But the new, 
Protestant view placed the individual above church and state. Each person now had 
the duty and right to seek this truth from God, through both the Bible (especially 
about spiritual things) and through nature (especially political matters and civil mo-
rality). "e church and the state existed to support and protect the rights of the indi-
vidual, one as a member of the spiritual world, the other as a citizen of the temporal 
world. "ere was a separation between these two powers, since their jurisdiction is 
limited to their separate spheres of concern, whether spiritual or civil. It is a separa-
tion of equality and mutual respect, with each entity respecting the sovereignty of 
the other in its own sphere. Hence, both are represented by the capital symbols “C” 
and “S.”
"e individual’s rights against the state, in turn, derived from the duties that 
he or she owed to God. "is is essentially the political expression of the Protestant 
model of the priesthood of all believers. It serves as a robust foundation for individ-
ual rights, hence the individual is shown by a capital “I.” "is is the model that we 
have traced through the early modern west and seen to be an important part of the 
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impulse to disestablishment in colonial America. 
1.3  Bayle and Skeptical Rights
"e third writer during this period was Pierre Bayle. While ostensibly a Calvin-
ist theologian, Bayle was actually a strongly skeptical thinker who based his view of 
toleration on broad epistemological skepticism. Bayle was accused by fellow Calvin-
ist theologians of supporting atheism, and was deprived of his professorship at his 
Protestant university as a result.7 Rather than an heir of Calvin and ancestor of the 
New England Puritans, Bayle was more an heir of Pyrrhonius and ancestor to Hume, 
Voltaire, Rousseau, and eventually Franklin and Je#erson.8 
Bayle largely shared Pufendorf ’s view on the supremacy of the state over the 
individual. He rejected Locke’s notion of a reciprocal contract between ruler and 
people, denied the right of rebellion, and upheld a strong duty of obedience to the 
ruler.9 But unlike Pufendorf, Bayle held a skeptical view of the world. Especially 
in the area of speculative truths, including religion, he a%rmed a strong di#erence 
from mathematical or empirical truths. For the former, he believed one could only 
attain a “reputed” truth, rather than actual truth.10 "is led Bayle to defend the no-
tion of individual conscience. 
Other thinkers of the day often spoke of the rights of conscience, but it was 
generally understood that they were not talking about erroneous conscience or acts 
against one’s conscience. Bayle was one of the $rst to propose that rights of con-
science should extend to consciences that were believed to be in error—the so-called 
“erroneous conscience.”11 Even if one could know that someone else was in error, 
argued Bayle, how could one know that the other person was convinced of that 
error?12 "is question was a central point of contention in the debate between Roger 
Williams and John Cotton over the issue of toleration and persecution. 
Bayle’s strong defense of conscience, then, was based on a weak view of truth, or 
at least human ability to know truth. "is led him to view individual judgment and 
conscience as important. "us, he held a strong view of the duty of the state to toler-
ate religious di#erences. To put Bayle’s view into our diagram looks like this:
7    Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 
285.    For an extended discussion of the opposition to Bayle within French Protestant circles see Guy H. Dodge, 
!e Political !eory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947).
8    Pierre Bayle, Political Writings, Sally L. Jenkinson, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2000), back cover; for a 
helpful overview of Bayle’s thought in relation to toleration see Sally Jenkinson, “Bayle and Leibniz: Two Paradigms 
of Tolerance and Some Re!ections on Goodness without God,” in John Christian Laursen, ed., Religious Toleration: 
“!e Variety of Rites” From Cyrus to Defoe (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 173-186.
9    Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West, 270.
10    Ibid., 282-283.
11    Ibid., 280-281; Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 219-233.
12    Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 145-149.
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"e lowercase “t”s represent the individualistic conception of truth, where no 
universal view of truth exists, but everyone conceives his or her own truth. Church 
and state are still separate, but it is not a separation of mutual equality and sovereign 
spheres. Rather, it is a separation based on a suspicion of the truth claims made 
by religious people. "e tolerance in this scheme is dependent on a commitment 
to skepticism—from the logic that if truth cannot be known, then no one can or 
should enforce it. "e real threats to this system are those who claim knowledge of 
absolute truths. 
Churches and people who believe in special revelation were such a threat. "ere-
fore, religious people and their beliefs are to be kept far away from politics and the 
public square generally. Separation of church and state, rather than being based on 
a view of separate sovereignties, becomes founded on hostility to the truth claims 
of religious people and their views of special revelation. Religious people and their 
ideas are kept not only out of government, but on the fringes of the public square 
generally. "e attitude under this view of the state towards the church was symboli-
cally expressed by Napoleon when, in contrast to Charlemagne, he crowned himself 
emperor in the presence of the pope. "e marginalization of the church and religion 
in this system is represented by a lowercase “c.”
Rights in this system are not quite as secure as under the Lockean view. Indi-
vidual autonomy is a somewhat fragile thing when it is based merely on skepticism, 
rather than on individual duties to, and rights before, God. "e solitary autonomy 
of the individual becomes fairly quickly outweighed by the interest of the group 
once accommodation of the individual becomes anything more than a slight in-
convenience. "is is seen very clearly in the skeptical/atheistic communist systems, 
where respect for the individual is very quickly submerged to the common good. 
A similar thing happens in a democracy, we have seen, when terrorism threatens 
national security. Hence, the “i” for individual is lowercase.
Under this model, there is no real reason why religious claims to truth should 
obtain greater protection than claims to convictions in other areas. Why should reli-
gious claims have special protection beyond that received by a wide range of special 
interest claims, such as environmentalists or animal rights supporters or advocates 
of unions and labor? People feel strongly about all these issues. If it is the individual 
conviction only that provides the basis for rights, as this model suggests, then all 
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these convictions should be treated equally. But ultimately, if all convictions are 
equally protected, none can be meaningfully protected, or democracy will ultimately 
become gridlocked amidst a cacophony of clashing rights claims.
1.4  Three Views in American History
My discussion of the third view has moved beyond what Bayle himself would 
have suggested into how at least parts of modern liberalism has developed this view. 
All three of these views, the Pufendor$an, the Lockean, and the Baylean models, 
have been in!uential at various times in American history. A side-by-side compari-
son of these models, a representative advocate, the historical periods they represent, 










mid-20th Century to 
9/11/2001
"e American Puritans developed a Pufendor$an-like church/state arrangement 
in early New England, with a civil magistrate involved in enforcing ecclesiasti-
cal rules and discipline. "us, the earliest American colonies were founded on the 
theory of the Medieval model on the left, with the exception of Rhode Island. Some 
later ones, especially New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and North Carolina, were 
founded basically on the Protestant theory in the center box, which also guided the 
formation of the national constitution. Despite Pufendorf ’s enormous in!uence in 
both Scotland and the American colonies, the founders of the American republic 
explicitly rejected his form of church/state arrangement.13 At the time of the Revo-
lution and the formation of the Constitution, Pufendorf ’s model of toleration was 
limited to two or three New England states, and within a few years vanished from 
even there.
It was Locke’s formulation, mediated by Madison, Witherspoon, and other key 
American thinkers, of dissenting Protestantism that carried the day in the founding 
13    Schneewind, !e Invention of Autonomy, 118.
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of the American republic. "eir views of the separate roles of the two powers were 
the ideological victors on the topic of tolerance and religious freedom in the early 
Republic. It is this shift from a medieval, paternalistic, hierarchical model to an 
individualistic, egalitarian, rights-based outlook that Gordon Wood so ably docu-
ments in his justly famed !e Radicalism of the American Revolution.14 Wood broadly 
and convincingly documents the change from hierarchy, patriarchy, aristocracy, and 
patronage to democracy, equality, republicanism and the rule of law in colonial 
America. "is chart can perhaps shed light on one of the puzzles in Wood’s book. In 
his sub-title, he asserts that the book shows “How a Revolution Transformed a Mo-
narchical Society into a Democratic One Unlike Any Other "at Had Ever Existed.” 
While he is right about the uniqueness of American society, it seems apparent from 
the story in his book that the Revolution did not cause the shift from monarchi-
cal to republican ethos. Rather, the Revolution was a symptom of a shift that had 
already occurred in American culture and society. 
Wood does an excellent job of describing that shift from monarchical to repub-
lican outlook, but o#ers, in my view, less than convincing arguments for the rea-
sons or causes of the shift. He focuses on the Enlightenment, arguing that “for the 
revolutionary generation America became the Enlightenment ful$lled.”15 "is raises 
the problem, earlier discussed, of trying to explain a movement with tremendous 
popular appeal by appeal to an elite a%nity and state of mind. Wood is unwilling 
to give religious thought much, if any, credit for the paradigm shift to a republican 
outlook, instead crediting Enlightenment and rationalistic sources. Indeed, he views 
religion as a conservative force that largely resisted that shift.16 
But it seems that Wood is looking at only one version of religion in telling this 
story, that of magisterial Protestantism. "is is most obviously displayed when he de-
scribes the belief in “liberty of conscience and separation of church and state” as an 
“Enlightenment belief ” that was resisted by “many religious groups.”17 Indeed, there 
were religious groups that opposed religious liberty and the separation of church and 
state. But the dominant religious groups in early Republican America had taken on 
a dissenting Protestant perspective, which Wood seems to miss almost completely. 
Wood’s larger story becomes much more explicable when religion and religious belief 
are given their due weight in shifting popular views along from a medieval to a prot-
estant outlook on church, society and the individual. 
"e religious support for American independence as well as religious liberty 
was well understood by those closer to the Revolution, such as Edmund Burke, the 
British parliamentarian. Burke famously explained the independent character of the 
American colonists by fact that “the people are Protestants, and of that kind which is 
the most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinions…. All Protestant-
14    (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).
15    Wood, !e Radicalism of the American Revolution, 191.
16    Ibid., 330-331.
17    Ibid. 331.
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ism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most preva-
lent in our northern colonies is a re$nement on the principle of resistance: it is the 
dissidence of dissent, and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion.”18 Burke, a strong 
critic of the Enlightenment-driven ideology of the French revolution, saw very dif-
ferent, and much more religious and Protestant principles at work in America.
But by the late nineteenth century, the rise of uncertainty in theology, science, 
and philosophy undermined the American Protestant outlook, and laid the ground-
work for a toleration based on skepticism. John Stuart Mill’s view of skeptical indi-
vidualism increasingly became the prism through which Locke was understood. As a 
consequence, the twentieth century saw a wholesale move, at least in the elite centers 
of thought, to toleration based on epistemological uncertainty and moral relativism.
After the Civil War, the rise of Darwinism, and the growth of philosophical 
uncertainty, many American elite institutions, including colleges and universities, 
the professions, and the media began to move towards the much more skeptical view 
represented by Bayle. "is shift did not happen overnight, and much has been writ-
ten on the involved process of secularization in American history.19 "e Protestant 
umbrella broadened to include an even more generic and di#use sense of American 
spiritual identity. 
"e in!uence of German higher idealism, with its attendant historicism and 
philosophy of relativism, in the mid-to-late-nineteenth and early twentieth century 
called into question the natural law foundations of the country. "is philosophy also 
undercut the Protestant model of church and society that was based on these views 
of natural law and natural rights. New approaches to the law based on social and 
pragmatic concerns accompanied the gradual acceptance of legal positivism. "ese 
ideas gained ground in the early twentieth century and especially in!uenced legal 
thought in the second-half of the twentieth century. 20 
"ese new ideas made progress to di#erent degrees in di#ering parts of society. 
"ey made greater inroads earlier in “elite” institutions, such as colleges and univer-
sities, and in the press and media. Old paradigms continued to hold sway at more 
popular levels. "e civil rights movement of the 50s and 60s could be described as 
the last gasp of Protestant-style natural rights/public morality arguments at the pop-
ular level, which combined with a more modern, liberal rights perspective among its 
18    Edmund Burke, !e Portable Edmund Burke, Kramnick, Isaac, ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books), 263 (empha-
sis added).
19    A good overview is provided by Christian Smith, !e Secular Revolution: Power, Interests, and Con#ict in the 
Secularization of American Public Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).    Helpful works dealing 
more generally with secularization in the west include, Callum G. Brown & Michael Snape, eds., Secularization in 
the Christian World: Essays in Honor of Hugh McLeod (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010); Hugh McLeod & Werner 
Urstorf, eds., !e Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003); Steve Bruce, ed., Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization !esis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
20    Steven Green documents the rise of the substitution of secular theories for natural law foundations occurring as 
early as the mid-19th century in a wide range of legal areas, from oaths, to probate law, to church property disputes, 
to Sunday closing laws.    Green, !e Second Disestablishment, 204-247.
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leadership, the media, and the courts. 
But the cycle of ideas has continued to roll, and now a vocal segment of the 
American public, especially after the events of 9/11, is vigorously rejecting the 
skepticism and relativism that has come to be associated with our current system of 
rights. Rather than returning to a pre-Mill, Lockean view, however, there are many 
who appear ready to embrace a model more like that of Pufendorf.21 In this post-
9/11 world, signi$cant segments of American society are simultaneously rejecting 
moral relativism as well as seeking for the security provided by a stronger govern-
ment. 
"is rejection of the modern paradigm moves society from the right side of the 
tolerance diagram generally leftward. It does not require a conscious repudiation of 
the importance of the individual to move over the Locke column into the Pufendorf 
column. "e di#erence between Locke and Pufendorf was not over their ostensible 
commitment to the individual and freedom to worship. Rather, it was that a strong 
view of the supremacy of the state generally negated Pufendorf ’s theoretically posi-
tive view of the individual.
But the point of all this for overseas observers is that a “secular” version of 
government that has a healthy and robust freedom of religion can exist in a highly 
religious community. France, with its de-religioned public square, is not the only, or 
most attractive, model of a “secular” government that exists. "e traditional Ameri-
can system o#ers a philosophical framework that is sympathetic towards religion 
and claims about a Supreme Being, while o#ering respect and accommodation to all 
religious claims that respect the well-being of the state and other individuals. 
In this system, while the state should not promote your religious view, you and 
your fellow believers should be free to do so, even within the public square, as long 
as you respect the rights and freedoms of others to do the same. In this sense, a fair 
and balanced state secularism can actually lead to a greater and more robust religios-
ity.
21    Scholars who would largely reject the stricter separation between church and state and would be sympathetic to 
a model of greater church-state cooperation would include Robert N. Bellah, !e Broken Covenant: American Civil 
Religion in Time of Trial (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 1992); Daniel Dreisbach, !omas Je$erson and 
the Wall of Separation Between Church and State (New York: NYU Press, 2003), Philip Hamburger, Separation of 
Church and State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Richard John Neuhaus, !e Public Square: Religion 
and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986); Harold J. Berman, 
Law and Revolution, II, !e Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2006).
